c o r t e x x x x ( 2 0 1 8 ) 1 e3 Available online at www.sciencedirect.com ScienceDirect Journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/cortex Clinical Postcard Delusional misidentification of inanimate objects, persons, and places after a left orbitofrontal cortex injury Miki Tanabe a, Michitaka Funayama b,*, Yota Narizuka a, Asuka Nakajima a, Isamu Matsukawa a and Tomoyuki Nakamura a a b Department of Rehabilitation, Ashikaga Red Cross Hospital, Tochigi, Japan Department of Neuropsychiatry, Ashikaga Red Cross Hospital, Tochigi, Japan article info Article history: Received 4 August 2018 Reviewed 8 August 2018 Revised 9 August 2018 Accepted 24 August 2018 Published online xxx Keywords: Delusional misidentification Inanimate objects Personal misidentification Orbitofrontal cortex Delusional misidentification, a condition in which a patient consistently misidentifies persons and places, rarely involves inanimate objects. Only two previous reports have described delusional misidentification of inanimate objects, which was caused by traumatic brain injury in one case (Abbate et al., 2012) and by delusional disorders in the other (Castillo & Berman, 1994). A neural basis was suggested in the case presented by Abbate et al. (2012), as the individual had right temporal lobe damage, although there must also have been diffuse axonal injury due to the nature of the traumatic brain injury. Here we describe a patient who presented with remarkable delusional misidentification of inanimate objects along with misidentification of persons and places after focal left orbitofrontal cortex damage due to subarachnoid hemorrhage. The patient was a 61-year-old right-handed man with 12 years of education. He had no past history of neurological or psychiatric diseases. He suffered rupture of an anterior communicating artery aneurysm (Hunt and Kosnik Ⅲ), which was clipped. A ventriculoperitoneal shunt was placed to treat hydrocephalus. He was admitted to a rehabilitation unit 2 months post-onset, where, although he was alert, he frequently confabulated and tried to go to work or acted as if he was working. Because of substantial behavioral symptoms, he was then moved to the neuropsychiatric unit, where he continued to receive physical, occupational, and linguistic rehabilitation. Upon neurological examination, he showed no palsy or sensory deficits, and his daily activities in the hospital were almost independent. He scored 33/36 on Raven's Colored Progressive Matrices (compared with 29.2 ± 5.4 in 60 sec for normal controls) (Sugishita & Yamazaki, 1993), suggesting he had normal intelligence. In contrast, he scored only 3/12 on the Japanese version of the Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test (cut-off score of 7 for 60 sec) (Watanuki, Hara, Miyamori, & Etoh, 2002) and 12/18 on the Japanese version of the Frontal Assessment Battery (compared with 14.6 ± .9 in 60 sec for normal controls) (Kugo et al., 2007), which reflected his episodic memory deficits and frontal dysfunction. His performance on the logical memory of Wechsler Memory Scale-Revised (Sugishita, 2001) was <2% in comparison with the percentiles for the healthy groups, in which he confabulated that eggs were broken by a traffic * Corresponding author. Department of Neuropsychiatry, Ashikaga Red Cross Hospital, Tochigi, 3260843, Japan. E-mail address: mctkfnym@gmail.com (M. Funayama). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2018.08.021 0010-9452/© 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Please cite this article in press as: Tanabe, M., et al., Delusional misidentification of inanimate objects, persons, and places after a left orbitofrontal cortex injury, Cortex (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2018.08.021 2 c o r t e x x x x ( 2 0 1 8 ) 1 e3 accident, rather than a truck loaded with eggs being broken. In the Frontal Assessment Battery, the subtests in which he showed a deficit were ‘conceptualization’, ‘mental flexibility’, and ‘motor programming’; in each of these he scored only one point out of three. Although he spoke fluently, was able to repeat a sentence correctly, and was able to comprehend complex command sentences for the most part, he sometimes showed word-finding difficulties along with occasional relevant verbal paraphasias, e.g., coffee for tea or ship for anchor. His overall linguistic score was 8 out of 10 on the Standard Language Test of Aphasia in Japanese (Hasegawa, Kishi, Shigeno, Tanemura, & Kusunoki, 1985), which reflected a poor result on the naming subcategory (12 correct answers out of 20 trials). For praxis, he performed perfectly on the Standard Performance Test for Apraxia, which includes use of eight everyday objects, e.g., a toothbrush or a hammer, (Iwata, 2003), suggesting that he did not show apraxia. These results indicate that even though he might have committed semantic errors on naming tasks due to misidentification of objects, he could use everyday objects at least in an experimental situation. During his stay in the hospital, however, he often showed confabulation and misidentification of persons and places. He often said that he was in his shop after he opened the door to his room in the unit. On one occasion, he confabulated that someone stole his favorite car from the parking lot in the hospital. Sometimes he misidentified rehabilitation staff as his niece or his younger sister, with whom he was very close. His confabulations occurred daily, whereas misidentification of individuals occurred about once a week. Computed tomography of his brain demonstrated a lowdensity area in the left orbitofrontal cortex and frontal pole (Fig. 1). In contrast to his apraxia test results in an experimental situation, the patient frequently misidentified inanimate objects, particularly tools during his stay in the hospital. For example, he used nail clippers as scissors, and he actually cut the hairline along his neck with the nail clippers. He used a toothbrush with toothpaste and tried to shave his beard. He tried to take outlets off the wall in his room because he thought they were closets. On another occasion, he called the wall in his room a refrigerator and said that he put his snacks in it. Likewise, he told an occupational staff to pass him his skin lotion from the sink in his room, which he Fig. 1 e Computed tomography of the patient's head at age 61. A low-density area was evident in the left orbitofrontal lobe and the left frontal pole. misidentified as a closet. He tried to pull a piece of disposable paper towel from a hot water dispenser after he washed his hands as if it was a paper towel storage box. He tried to unlock doors and lockers in his room or in the unit with his toothbrush or his glasses in an attempt to go to his shop, which he thought was located on the opposite side of those doors and lockers. He sometimes realized his errors when he was given feedback about these misidentifications from an occupational therapist, although there were times when he did not seem to consider this feedback. When an occupational therapist asked him to provide a name for the glasses that he had just previously used as a key to open a door, he mistakenly called the glasses a key. In the next moment, when he was shown those objects by the occupational therapist, he correctly gave the name of a key and of glasses, respectively, and was able to use them correctly. Although his misidentification of tools and their related uses were noted every day while he was in his room, this behavior disappeared when he was instructed to use the tools for a task by an occupational therapist, suggesting that his deficit differs from apraxia. For the most part, he also used those tools correctly while he was with other patients and after he was moved to a room for two patients. His misidentification of tools remained when he was discharged from the hospital to a nursing home 7 months post-onset. Confabulation and misidentification of persons and places then continued, albeit to a lesser degree. In summary, his misidentifications and confabulations occurred frequently when he was in his room, which might have allowed him to remain in his own world, without acknowledging the reality of the external world. In contrast, his misidentifications often disappeared when he was provided external reality cues via other patients. This case is unique with respect to the patient's remarkable misidentification of tools, which were replaced by a completely different kind of tool. In previous reports on delusional misidentification of inanimate objects, the original objects were replaced by an older or lower-quality one of the same kind, e.g., a new item of jewelry would be replaced by an older or lower-quality one (Abbate et al., 2012; Castillo & Berman, 1994). In contrast, in this case, the individual replaced one tool with a different kind of tool, e.g., nail clippers being used as scissors. Delusional misidentification has been associated with frontal lobe lesions, particularly the right frontal lobe (Alexander, Stuss, & Benson, 1979; Feinberg & Roane, 2005). The lesion in the patient described here is in the left frontal lobe, which differs from previous lesions (Alexander et al., 1979; Feinberg et al., 2005). This difference might reflect the different kind of misidentification, i.e., tools and persons. The former is closely associated with the left hemisphere (Lambon Ralph, Jefferies, Patterson, & Rogers, 2007), whereas the neural basis of an individual's semantic memories has been found to reside in the right hemisphere (Ellis, Young, & Critchley, 1989; Gorno-Tempini et al., 2004). In addition, the orbitofrontal cortex, which is considered to have a role in differentiating the mental world from the external world (Burgess, 2007; Schiner, 2013), might contribute to substantial misidentification that includes tools, persons, and places. For example, if he wants to meet Please cite this article in press as: Tanabe, M., et al., Delusional misidentification of inanimate objects, persons, and places after a left orbitofrontal cortex injury, Cortex (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2018.08.021 c o r t e x x x x ( 2 0 1 8 ) 1 e3 his niece with whom he is close, he might falsely recognize an occupational therapist as his niece, resulting in misidentification of persons. If he wants to shave his beard and yet has no shaving cream or shaver, he might use his toothbrush to apply toothpaste like shaving cream, i.e., delusional misidentification of inanimate objects. When he wants to go to work, he might think that the door in his room leads to his office, and he might act as if he is working in his laundry, reflecting misidentification of place and confabulation, respectively. This case might shed some light on the mechanisms behind delusional misidentification and, in particular, on misidentification of inanimate objects. Consent Written informed consent was obtained from the patient and the patient's wife. Funding No funding declared. Competing interests The authors declare that they have no competing interests. Authors’ contributions MT, MF, YN, and AN acquired case data, designed the study, and drafted the manuscript. IM and TN supervised the study. Acknowledgements We express our sincere thanks to the patient and his family members. 3 references Abbate, C., Trimarchi, P. D., Salvi, G. P., Quarenghi, A. M., Vergani, C., & Luzzatti, C. (2012). Delusion of inanimate doubles: Description of a case of focal retrograde amnesia. Neurocase, 18, 457e477. Alexander, M. P., Stuss, D. T., & Benson, D. F. (1979). Capgras syndrome: A reduplicative phenomenon. Neurology, 29, 334e339. Burgess, P. W., Gilbert, S. J., & Dumontheil, I. (2007). 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Please cite this article in press as: Tanabe, M., et al., Delusional misidentification of inanimate objects, persons, and places after a left orbitofrontal cortex injury, Cortex (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2018.08.021